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Abstract
Cooperation in the evolutionary snowdrift game with a self-questioning updating mechanism is studied on annealed and quenched
small-world networks with directed couplings. Around the payoff parameter value r = 0.5, we find a size-invariant symmetrical
cooperation effect. While generally suppressing cooperation for r > 0.5 payoffs, rewired networks facilitated cooperative behavior
for r < 0.5. Fair amounts of noise were found to break the observed symmetry and further weaken cooperation at relatively
large values of r. However, in the absence of noise, the self-questioning mechanism recovers symmetrical behavior and elevates
altruism even under large-reward conditions. Our results suggest that an updating mechanism of this type is necessary to stabilize
cooperation in a spatially structured environment which is otherwise detrimental to cooperative behavior, especially at high cost-
to-benefit ratios. Additionally, we employ component and local stability analyses to better understand the nature of the manifested
dynamics.
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1. Introduction
Understanding the ubiquity of cooperative behavior in com-
plex biological, technological, social, and economic networks
has become one of the central research topics in the past years
in a variety of disciplines, including physics [1, 2, 3, 4]. In
the course of this challenging process of scientific enquiry, the
evolutionary game theory emerged as a common mathematical
framework for investigating how and why individuals happen
to overcome selfish behavior in order to help others and to con-
tribute to the common good [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
Within this framework, two widely discussed games are the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Snowdrift (SD) Game, where
in both cases, the bilateral cooperation yields the highest col-
lective payoff, equally distributed between the interacting play-
ers [6]. However, providing help to a neighboring individual is
challenged by the presence of an alternative defecting strategy,
that warrants the defector a higher benefit at the expense of a
cooperating agent.
The major difference between the PD and SD games is man-
ifested in the actual ranking of the payoff values, i.e. in the
manner by which defecting agents are punished when facing
one another. In the PD game, a defecting agent facing another
defector earns more than a cooperator, while in the SD game,
which can be seen as a modified PD game, mutual defection
gives the lowest payoff. We therefore have the reversed situa-
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tion where a cooperator obtains a higher payoff than a defector
when the latter interacts with another defecting agent.
Thus, while in the PD game we have T > R > P > S ranking
of the payoffs, for the SD game this ranking is given by T >
R > S > P. Here, the payoff for bilateral cooperation is denoted
with R, whereas P represents the payoff for mutual defection. T
is the temptation to defect by one of the two interacting sides,
resulting in the payoff S (the ”sucker’s payoff”) for the other,
cooperating player.
At first, this apparently minor difference between the two
payoff rankings might seem as rather unimportant, however, it
has been demonstrated [7, 8] that it can have a fundamental im-
pact on the final evolutionary outcome of a studied system in
the sense of altering the actual level of cooperative behavior
whenever interacting individuals are facing a social dilemma.
Whereas investigations on simple regular lattices yielded far
more converging results, studies of PD and SD games on com-
plex networks are still rather inconclusive about the overall
structural effects on cooperation [1, 10]. Earlier reports sug-
gested that spatial structure generally tends to facilitate cooper-
ative behavior [8, 14, 15]. Indeed, the scale-free topology [16]
was found to be consistently beneficial for overcoming selfish
behavior in both PD and SD games [17]. However, there have
been many opposite findings in recent years in other than scale-
free topologies [7, 18, 19, 20, 21]. In addition, a number of
special conditions for the elevation and inhibition of coopera-
tion in both game types have been identified [22, 23].
Prompted by the observation that structured SD and PD
games often result in different densities of cooperative agents
under different connection topologies [7, 8, 14, 15, 24], an ever
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increasing effort has been dedicated to a better understanding
of the mechanisms involved in this ’spatial selection’ process
[10, 11, 17, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. Representa-
tive examples are the pertaining studies of the emergence and
survival of cooperation on directed networks [17, 34, 35, 36].
Directed interaction [37, 38, 39, 40], found in many social and
economic systems, implies here that an agent influencing its
nearest-neighbor may not be influenced by this neighbor in re-
turn. Thus, the influence spreads in one direction only.
Besides the effects of topology, it has been demonstrated ear-
lier that the peculiarities of strategy update rules in theoretical
social dilemma models can play a decisive role in shaping the
evolutionary dynamics of cooperation [41, 42, 43]. Different
strategy updating rules have been studied so far, for example,
the widely applied deterministic rule proposed by Nowak and
May [8, 24], and the stochastic evolutionary rule by Szabo´ and
To¨ke [44].
Motivated by the yet understudied effects of directed net-
work topologies and alternative updating rules, the scope of
the present paper is to identify the pertinent mechanisms lead-
ing to cooperative behavior in SD-type of interactions on an-
nealed and quenched small-world networks [45, 46] with di-
rected links. A special attention is given to an alternative strat-
egy updating rule, the so-called self-questioning mechanism
[32, 47], and its influence on cooperative behavior under noisy
conditions.
In the course of self-questioning, players typically compare
their current and the opposite strategies, and then eventually
adopt a more advantageous strategy with a certain probability.
The self-questioning mechanism can therefore be seen as a kind
of a self-evaluation procedure that helps in maximizing the ben-
efits of interacting agents.
To prevent deterministic behavior of the model and allow for
irrational decision making, we study the effects of noise, imple-
mented here as a low probability with which an agent shifts
from its own strategy to the strategy of a randomly chosen
neighbor. Considering such noise effects in models of social
dynamics [48, 49, 50, 51] might be useful for a better under-
standing of the influence of bounded rationality in evolutionary
snowdrift and other games [52]; see also Ref. [53] for cooper-
ation under noisy conditions in the PD game and Ref. [54] for
noise effects in both PD and SD games. Finally, we employ an
extensive local stability analysis inspired by the Ref. [32], and
also implement a component analysis, in order to better under-
stand the nature of the observed cooperative behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we detail the model structure and the associated
game dynamics. In Section 3, we outline the simulation
results and investigate the possible origin of the manifested
cooperative behavior. In Section 4, we analyze the influence
of the introduced strategy updating rule on cooperation under
different reward and noisy conditions. Section 5 describes
analytic methods useful for a further comprehension of the
obtained results. Finally, we conclude and suggest further
research directions in Section 6.
2. Model
In the present paper, all simulations are carried out for the
snowdrift (SD) game which we first outline below and then de-
scribe the simulation setup.
In the SD game [55], players obtain a payoff R = b − c/2
when they both cooperate, and a payoff P = 0 when they both
defect. When one player cooperates but the other one defects,
the defector gets the payoff T = b, and the cooperator receives
the payoff S = b − c. The SD game refers to the case b >
c > 0, leading to the payoff ranking T > R > S > P. For
simplicity, we assign R = 1 to characterize all payoffs by a
single parameter r = c/2 = c/(2b − c), defined as the cost-to-
benefit ratio. The payoffs are then rewritten as T = 1+ r, R = 1,
S = 1 − r, and P = 0, or, when shown in a rescaled payoff
matrix
C
D
C D(
1 1 − r
1 + r 0
) (1)
where 0 < r < 1. Each matrix element represents here the
payoff of a player selecting a strategy from the left hand column
when the opponent selects a strategy listed in the top row.
In the initial configuration of our model, all players occupy-
ing the network sites are assigned a strategy, either as a coop-
erator (C) or as a defector (D), with equal probability. Thus,
we assume that each vertex of a network, ranging from a reg-
ular L × L square lattice to a random graph by modifying p, is
populated by a player choosing just cooperation or defection.
Following the initial distribution of strategies, player interac-
tions and strategy updates are repeated in an iterative fashion
in accordance with the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation method.
Size-wise, simulations are conducted on networks with L =
100, L = 300, and L = 500. Furthermore, we separately inves-
tigate the model behavior evolving on quenched and annealed
small-world networks. More specifically, the underlying evo-
lutionary dynamics are generated by the following elementary
events:
(1) We first construct a small-world network with directed
couplings [56]. Starting with an L×L regular lattice, where each
node is bidirectionally connected with its four neighbors, we
rewire with probability p each of the outward links to another
randomly chosen node.
(2) At each time step, players occupying the nodes of a di-
rected small-world network of a size L2 obtain payoffs on the
basis of the above described payoff matrix by interacting with
all outward-connected neighbors in accordance with the SD
game rules. A player i obtains a payoff Vi = Vi/4 by interacting
with its four outward-linked neighbours, where Vi is obtained
by summing up the payoffs of all outward-linked neighbors.
Subsequently, by means of self-questioning in a virtual game
[32, 47], each player adopts its anti-strategy and estimates a vir-
tual payoff Vv = Vv/4, where Vv is obtained by summing up the
virtual payoffs of all the outward-linked neighbors. By compar-
ing the virtual payoff with the real payoff, players can estimate
their optimal strategy corresponding to the highest payoff and
realize whether their current strategy is of any advantage [47].
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Specifically, player i will shift from its current strategy to its
anti-strategy with the strategy transition probability w, defined
as the normalized difference between the estimated virtual pay-
off Vv and the actual real payoff Vi:
w =
Vv − Vi
1 + r
(2)
where 1 + r in the denominator is only a normalization factor
[31], and as such, does not affect the results reported in the sub-
sequent sections. If w > 0, then the current strategy of player i
is updated with probability w, i.e. replaced by the more advan-
tageous anti-strategy; otherwise, it remains unchanged.
(3) Network nodes are randomly scanned until each one is
selected once and then the rewiring process of step (1) and the
strategy evolution of step (2) are repeated.
Given these 3 outlined steps, we stress here that we inves-
tigate a total of two different cases, i.e., 1) simulations on
quenched and 2) annealed small-world networks.
In the first case, we assume that after a directed small-world
network is once established, the system evolves based on iterat-
ing the step (2). Here the SD game dynamically evolves on the
static topology of the network with a fixed link directedness,
which we here call the quenched network [45, 57].
In the second case, we consider the system evolution based
on repeating all outlined steps, i.e. the steps (1), (2) and (3).
Thus, after initially constructing a directed small-world net-
work and then following the update of strategies in accordance
with step (2), all nodes of the network are subsequently scanned
and the rewiring process of step (1) is re-initiated, leading
thereby to a different realization of rewired links. The process
is then further cycled with steps (2) and (3) following the step
(1). In this particular case, the SD game is said to evolve on an
annealed network [37, 45, 46].
Finally, we note here again that in the SD game, the best
action for a player is to defect if the opponent cooperates, but
otherwise it is better to opt for cooperation. However, larger
values of the payoff parameter r in the SD game generally tend
to encourage defection [7, 32]. We therefore investigate what
is the critical value of r for and under which cooperation is still
promoted given the specified structural and strategy update
characteristics of our model. Thus, it is important to investigate
how the frequency of cooperators fc dynamically relies on
the payoff parameter r and on the spatial structure, i.e. the
rewiring probability p of the network (where fc is the ratio of
the number of cooperators and the total number of individuals
in a population).
3. Evolution of cooperation as a function of the spatial
structure ( fc vs. p)
3.1. fc vs. p on quenched and annealed networks
In Fig. 1(a) and (b), we show fc as a function of p for
quenched and annealed networks with directed couplings. We
observe a symmetrical cooperation behavior around the payoff
parameter value r = 0.5 for both networks. Cooperation domi-
nates for r < 0.5, but is significantly suppressed for r > 0.5 as
p increases. For r = 0.5, fc remains stable for a wide range of
values of p. The displayed results in Fig. 1 are the outcomes
of simulations conducted on networks with 100 × 100 nodes.
Simulations on larger networks (300 × 300 and 500 × 500) did
not yield significantly different results (not shown).
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Figure 1: The frequency of cooperators fc as a function of the rewiring prob-
ability p is displayed in (a) and (b), with circles, squares, triangles, diamonds,
pluses, crosses and stars standing for (from top to bottom) r=0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5,
0.7, 0.9 and 1.0. (a) shows the quenched network and (b) the annealed network.
The red dashed curves are the theoretical fits.
For an intuitive understanding of the evolutionary behavior
of the system, we investigated the spatial patterns associated
with different values of p and r. In Fig. 2, we illustrate the typi-
cal patterns emerging on a quenched small-world network with
directed links. The annealed network shows similar behavior
(here not shown). The displayed patterns are independent of
the initial configuration and statistically static after the system
reaches the steady state. In Fig. 2(a), cooperating and defecting
agents are scattered over the lattice in a chessboard-like fashion
for the parameter values p = 0.2 and r = 0.2, i.e. sites with one
strategy are roughly regularly surrounded by the sites with the
opposite strategy.
We then increase the rewiring probability up to p = 0.8 while
keeping the payoff value r = 0.2 unchanged (Fig. 2(b)). It
can be observed here that at fixed and low r, cooperators start
to form clusters as the rewiring probability increases. In con-
trast, when increasing and fixing the payoff parameter value at
r = 0.8, and again modifying p from p = 0.2 to p = 0.8, the
observable strategy pattern transforms from a state of scattered
cooperators and defectors into the state of clustered defectors
(Fig. 2(c) and (d)). This is consistent with previous findings
showing that low r stimulates cooperative behavior, whereas
elevated r values tend to hinder the evolution of cooperation
[7, 32].
3.2. The effects of inward-link heterogeneity and long-range in-
teraction
To clarify whether the inward-link heterogeneity influences
cooperation, one can remove it by artificially fixing the num-
ber of the inward links kin. If cooperative behavior remains
qualitatively unchanged after such a modification, one can then
3
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Figure 2: Representative simulation snapshots for the spatial snowdrift game af-
ter a sufficiently long transient time. The results are shown for a 30×30 portion
of the full 100 × 100 lattice with typical spatial patterns emerging via agent in-
teractions on the quenched network, with C(D) nodes displayed as solid(open)
circles. (a) is for p = 0.2 and r = 0.2, (b) for p = 0.8 and r = 0.2, (c) for
p = 0.2 and r = 0.8, and (d) for p = 0.8 and r = 0.8.
eliminate the possible influence of inward-links. Taking again
the quenched network as an example, in Fig. 3(a) we show fc as
a function of p with fixed inward-links as kin = 4, which corre-
sponds to a regular lattice. We see that fc again shows a familiar
symmetrical behavior, as without this link fixation. Moreover,
we find that fc remains nearly steady for many different val-
ues of kin, as shown in Fig. 3(b). Additionally, we found that
also the annealed network simulations with fixed inward-links
resulted in a qualitatively similar behavior.
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Figure 3: (a) The frequency of cooperators fc as a function of the rewiring
probability p is displayed for the quenched network with a fixed number of
inward-links kin = 4. Circles, squares, triangles, diamonds, pluses, crosses and
stars correspond to the payoff parameter values (from top to bottom) r=0.0, 0.1,
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 1.0. (b) fc as a function of kin for a rewired probability p =
0.3, and with open (solid) circles standing for r = 0.2 and open (solid) triangles
for r = 0.8, both simulated on quenched (annealed) networks, respectively.
To further understand the origin of the symmetrical co-
operation observed in Fig.1, we study the possible effect of
long-range interactions by analyzing the model evolution on
quenched and annealed small-world networks with undirected
links. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the rewiring process has little
effect on the cooperation level for the undirected quenched net-
work. However, the previously discovered symmetrical behav-
ior remains robust in this undirected couplings version, under
both quenched and annealed network regimes.
Having eliminated the long-range interaction and the inward-
link heterogeneity effects on the symmetrical behavior, we ask
whether it is the nature of the implemented strategy updating
rule (generalized self-questioning mechanism) that is actually
causing the observed cooperation symmetry. We address this
issue in a more detail in the subsequent section.
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Figure 4: The frequency of cooperators fc as a function of the rewiring prob-
ability p in (a) quenched and (b) annealed undirected small-world networks.
Circles, squares, triangles, diamonds and pluses correspond to (from top to bot-
tom) r=0.0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.00.
3.3. The effect of noise
To prevent the purely deterministic behavior and to enable ir-
rational choices, we introduced noise wnoise in the model while
keeping the model topology unchanged, i.e., the noise effects
were studied on quenched and annealed small-world networks
with directed links. More specifically, randomness was imple-
mented as a low probability with which a player shifts from
its own strategy to the strategy of a randomly chosen neigh-
bor. Surprisingly, we find that only after this direct modifi-
cation of the previously implemented strategy update rule the
results started to change (see Fig. 5). In particular, the ob-
served cooperation symmetry is broken after directly influenc-
ing the strategy updating mechanism via noise. These changes
are visible already after adding a rather small amount of noise
wnoise = 0.05, but a clearly more pronounced effect is observed
for wnoise ≥ 0.1 (Fig. 5).
Taken together, these results suggest that the symmetrical
behavior of fc arises due to the characteristics of the imple-
mented game rule, i.e., due to the so-called self-questioning
mechanism [32, 47] which drives the process of strategy
updating in our model. In contrast, enabling irrational choice
behavior via noise breaks the cooperation symmetry, however,
it is unclear yet whether the self-questioning mechanism can
support cooperative clusters against the destructive effect of
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Figure 5: The effect of noise wnoise = 0.1 on the behavior of (a) quenched and
(b) annealed small-world networks with directed couplings. Circles, squares,
triangles, diamonds and pluses correspond to (from top to bottom) r = 0.0,
0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.00.
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Figure 6: The fraction of cooperators fc as a function of r is displayed. (a)
shows the results for the quenched and (b) for the annealed network. The
open circles and the triangles correspond to simulation results with the self-
questioning mechanism without noise, and with the rewiring probabilities
p = 0.1 and p = 0.3, respectively. The solid circles and triangles correspond to
simulation outcomes obtained under noisy conditions, with the noise parameter
value set at wnoise = 0.1 and the rewiring probabilities p = 0.1 and p = 0.3,
respectively.
noise also under large-reward conditions, i.e. at high cost-to-
benefit ratios. This is investigated in detail in the following
section.
4. Dependence of fc on r
4.1. The self-questioning mechanism without noise
We now investigate the fraction of cooperators fc as a func-
tion of the payoff parameter r in the SD-game on quenched and
annealed small-world networks with an implemented general-
ization of the self-questioning mechanism described in Section
2. Here we care more about the evolution of cooperation at
a relatively small value of the rewiring probability p, because
larger p typically results in too many random realizations of
long-range interactions among interacting players.
As shown in Fig. 6 (open circles and triangles), fc is ob-
served to decay with r both in quenched and annealed networks
with directed couplings. More interestingly, step-wise decay of
cooperation not seen in the annealed network and sharp transi-
tions at the critical points rc = 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 are observed
for the quenched small-world network.
The decay dependence of fc on r can be explained analyti-
cally from the payoff matrix shown in Table 1, where the total
transition probabilities WC→D from C to D and WD→C from D
to C can be calculated as 4 − 112(1+r) and −4 +
13
2(1+r) ; they are
monotonously increasing and decaying with r, respectively.
To understand the critical transition points rc, we apply an
extensive local stability analysis, following the method detailed
in Ref. [32]. At each critical point rc, the payoff of a cooper-
ating player should equal that of a defector. The local stability
equation is then written as
m + (kout − m)(1 − rc) = (1 + rc)m, (3)
where kout is the number of the out-going links, with kout = 4 in
our model, and m is the number of C neighbours. One can get
rc = (kout−m)/kout, and therefore obtain rc= 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75,
which is in excellent agreement with the obtained simulation
results.
4.2. Self-questioning under noisy conditions
To further understand the nature of the observed cooperation
in the SD-game on complex networks with the self-questioning
mechanism, we investigate the evolution of fc as a function of
r when the strategy updating is disturbed by noise, i.e. by the
introduction of random choices. As can be seen in Fig. 6 (solid
circles and triangles), the level of cooperation in the total popu-
lation of agents decreases as a function of r, also in the presence
of noise. Slight concavities of the solid circles and triangles are
visible as remnants of the previously observed critical points rc
in the quenched network, however, the previous step-wise de-
cay is now almost totally smoothed out by noise.
Furthermore, we see that a fair amount of noise generally
hinders the evolution of cooperation for a wide range of val-
ues of r (especially for larger r), and this holds true for both
quenched and annealed networks. However, in the absence of
noise, the process of repeated self-questioning can re-establish
symmetrical cooperation behavior and elevate altruism among
interacting agents even under large values of r (see the curves
with open circles and triangles in Fig. 6). These results sug-
gest that self-questioning can serve as a highly useful cooper-
ation supporting mechanism in noise-free environments, but is
not robust enough against the destructive effects of noise-driven
random choices.
5. Component Analysis
To further understand the evolution of cooperation in our
model, we apply a theoretical analysis, which we here call the
component analysis. We first specify that each player occupy-
ing a network vertex can have a total of five possible neighbor-
hood configurations. The payoffmatrix can then be analytically
obtained from the strategy update rules, as shown in Table 1. EC
and ED are the payoffs of the cooperating (C) and defecting (D)
players, wC→D is the transition probability with which a player
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Table 1: The payoff matrix in the SD game with a generalized self-questioning
mechanism. From left to right, the columns correspond to the neighborhood
configuration, the payoff of the C player EC , the payoff of the D player ED , the
probability of transition from C to D wC→D , and the probability of transition
from D to C wD→C , respectively.
EC ED wC→D wD→C
C C C C 1 1 + r 1 − 11+r 0
C C C D 1 − r4
3
4 +
3r
4 1 −
5
4(1+r) −1 +
5
4(1+r)
C C D D 1 − r2
1
2 +
r
2 1 −
3
2(1+r) −1 +
3
2(1+r)
C D D D 1 − 3r4
1
4 +
r
4 1 −
7
4(1+r) −1 +
7
4(1+r)
D D D D 1 − r 0 0 −1 + 21+r
shifts from C to D, and wD→C is the the transition probability
for shifting from D to C. The frequency of cooperators fc is then
written as
fc =
5∑
i=1
giCw
i
C→C + g
i
Dw
i
D→C , (4)
where i = 1, ..., 5 labels the corresponding neighbour configu-
rations shown in the leftmost column of the Table 1. giC and
giD are the proportions of the C and D players in the system,
with
∑5
i=1(giC + giD) = 1. wiC→C is the probability that C players
do not change their strategy, with wiC→C = 1 − wiC→D. Due to
the difficulty of obtaining the giC and giD analytically, we com-
pute these proportions from numerical simulations. As shown
in Fig. 1(a) and (b) with the red dashed curves, the theoretical
fits of fc vs. p are in a very good agreement with those obtained
from numerical simulations.
6. Conclusions
In the present paper, we have studied the evolutionary SD-
game with a generalized self-questioning updating mechanism.
The model was investigated on both annealed and quenched
small-world networks with directed couplings. Agent-based
computer simulations and semi-analytic results have been pre-
sented.
We found that the observed symmetrical cooperation effect
around the payoff parameter value r = 0.5 was size-invariant
and independent from both the inward-link heterogeneity and
long-range interactions in the studied small-world network.
Moreover, our results suggest that the self-questioning updat-
ing mechanism might be necessary to stabilize cooperation in
a spatially structured environment which is otherwise not ben-
eficial or even detrimental to cooperative behavior. Our results
thus support the previous findings showing that spatial struc-
ture should not necessarily be seen as a general promoter of
cooperation [7], and that one should rather avoid the concep-
tual flaws of many recent studies according to which an imple-
mented topology automatically enhances cooperative behavior
by default.
Compared with the previous work in this field [32, 47], our
version of the self-questioning mechanism showed clear advan-
tages in (re)establishing and sustaining symmetrical coopera-
tive behavior. However, we found that the cooperation promot-
ing effects of the implemented updating rule were not robust
enough under noisy conditions. On the other hand, in the ab-
sence of noise, the self-questioning mechanism was able to re-
cover elevated altruism even at large cost-to-benefit ratios. We
therefore argue that our updating mechanism can function as an
efficient cooperation elevator in complex environments where
the impact of noise is insignificant or totally absent.
In the presented model, the rewiring of the network was in-
dependent from the actual cooperation status of the individual
network nodes. It would therefore be much more interesting in
future studies to let links between two rarely cooperating nodes
vanish with higher probability than links between frequently
cooperating nodes [58]. In future investigations one should also
employ the simulated annealing method [59], in order to better
avoid the local extrema trap, and to enable the system to get
into the global extremum.
As suggested in Ref. [60], future computer simulations
should also explore networks with weighted links, since in
the present paper all network connections were equally strong.
However, in real social networks, people typically have many
initial connections, but after a sufficient time, only a few of
them survive as strong and important [10, 61].
Another line of future generalizations that could potentially
make our model more realistic would include simulations with
reproducing agents [36], different migratory behaviors of in-
teracting individuals [50, 53], bottleneck and ageing effects on
cooperation [62], or the influence of the approaching extinction
of a studied population [63].
In sum, presented results demonstrate that under noise-free
conditions, the self-questioning updating mechanism can be-
come advantageous for cooperation in the evolutionary snow-
drift game on both annealed and quenched small-world net-
works with directed links. It remains therefore a challenge for
future studies to search for advanced modifications of the intro-
duced updating rule which could then fully resist the destructive
effects of noise.
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